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Before entering into a detailed examination of the elections that were held in Latin 
America in 2002, it is worth noting the unique historical situation in the region since the 
start of the ‘third wave’ of democratization. The past 25 years have seen the longest and 
most far-reaching process of democratization in the region2. Despite the unequal results 
achieved by the democratic process in terms of both development and quality, it is in the 
area of civil liberties that perhaps the greatest change has taken place. The historical 
context, experiences at home and the international situation have led democracy to be the 
only viable option during the entire period. Any government hoping to retain a hold on 
power must declare itself openly democratic and adhere to the results of the ballot box. It 
must institutionalize the political process, guarantee human rights, maintain an 
independent judicial system, plurality and freedom of expression, ie, introduce 
democratic practices that are absent in authoritarian regimes. 
 
Never before have there been so many elected democratic governments, nor as many 
transitions towards democracy. This has not necessarily implied full satisfaction with 
democracy; indeed, even in those countries where democracy has been firmly 
established, much of the population is still disappointed with the economic and social 
results. As the United Nations Development Program3 notes, many engaged in the fight 
for democracy in the hope that it would bring with it social justice, greater participation 
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in the political process and a peaceful solution to conflict. And, rightly or wrongly, they 
also believed that democracy would bring economic development. Today, two decades 
later, we can see that in too many countries, democracy has not improved living standards 
for many people. 
 
Indeed, in many countries, progress in democratization has been unequal and has not 
been accompanied by significant improvements in living standards. While political 
development has been indispensable, all too often it has not been sufficient to guarantee 
political stability. Economic development was required in order to provide the system 
with the necessary balance to satisfy the electorate’s expectations. The reality of Latin 
America shows that all countries in the region face important social and economic 
limitations, and therefore challenges in both economic and social terms, the persistence of 
which presents a potential threat to political stability and governability. 
 
Disenchantment with politics is reflected time and time again in surveys carried out in 
Latin America, and seems largely to be motivated by deep-rooted economic and social 
problems that somehow or other hinder the appearance of greater opportunities and a 
rising standard of living. The result is apathy, a distancing from the political process, and 
loss of confidence in the system as a means to solve important problems. In spite of this, 
the process of democratization continues, although with limitations that are difficult to 
overcome. Opinion polls and qualitative studies show that governments and the main 
political parties rapidly lose support. Faced with such a picture, we might well ask 
ourselves how and why Latin America’s democracies survive. Why have we not seen a 
return to the democracy-authoritarianism cycle? 
 
Some analysts suggest that the survival of democracy is due less to its own merits, than to 
the lack of individuals aiming to establish a different political system; hence, the 
perseverance of democracy in Latin America is not an endogenous process arising from 
its greater legitimacy, but an externally defined mechanism resulting from the absence of 
agents acting expressly against it.4 The optimists however, would say that despite its 
weaknesses and limitations, democracy is the best political system we have, and that 
although in itself it does not guarantee equality, rapid economic growth or stability, the 
links between democracy and human development can be strong, even though in almost 
all countries they need strengthening further5. 
 
The region faces a democratic shortfall (albeit with important differences between 
countries) and a difficult economic and social situation. Despite reforms, economic 
growth has been slow and volatile. And with poverty levels of 40%, wealth distribution is 
unequal (the worst in the world). All of this has generated growing concern for the 
political health of Latin America as regards the deepening, consolidation and durability 
of democracy. Although the last two decades have seen the end of authoritarian regimes 
and the spread of democracy was an extraordinary event that brought about extremely 
important benefits for the population, at the start of the new millennium joy for the 
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inexorable spread of democracy has given way to a more sober prospect, focused on the 
major challenges facing Latin America on the economic, social, and political fronts. 
 
The Electoral Year in Context 
The Socio-economic Context 
Data from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) show that Latin America 
faces one of the most critical periods of recent decades. While some economies are 
experiencing moderate growth, at least five are in recession. Per capita income is lower 
than five years ago, consumption has stopped, and investment is at its lowest level in ten 
years. After almost half a decade of externally imposed financial restrictions, and low 
internal growth, most countries have lost any room for manoeuvre to face the effects of 
the economic cycle.6
 
According to CEPAL data, Latin America’s economic performance fell by 0.5% in 2002. 
Per capita growth was negative at -1.9% for the second year running. The worst-affected 
economies were Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, while the others barely managed 
the same levels of GDP growth as last year. Overall, the region has accumulated negative 
growth of -0.3% over the last five years based on the average annual per capita GDP 
from 1998. This negative process is due to a range of factors; in particular the 
international economic situation, which has seen a decline in trade in the region overall. 
Investors have also kept away, and the ramifications of the Argentine crisis continue to 
be felt. Given that practically no country has been able to manage even moderate growth, 
it can safely be said that the region overall is stuck in a period of economic stagnation7. 
As the CEPAL report all too clearly shows, the most outstanding aspect of economic 
policy in 2002 was the confirmation that the authorities there have less freedom to 
manage the economy. This is due both to external restrictive factors, although it is also a 
response to the imbalances accumulated during the better years.8
 
Social Factors 
Given the stagnation throughout the region, the labour market has weakened, with the 
average unemployment rate for the region rising to 9.1% during 2002, almost one 
percentage point higher than over the last two years. In Argentina, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela, the figure was over 15%. This has had a 
clear impact on poverty levels. According to CEPAL, poverty levels rose to 43% of the 
population in 2001, while the extremely poor now make up 18.6%. Estimates for 2002 
point to 44% and possibly up to 20%, respectively. Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and 




                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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Popular Opinion 
To economic uncertainty should be added the growing popular discontent in many 
countries. This has mainly shown itself through a rejection of politics and of politicians. 
Such attitudes and perceptions are reflected in opinion polls and in the degree to which 
people take part in the political process. The Latinobarómetro survey for 2002 clearly 
shows this growing disenchantment. While 56% of Latin Americans say they support 
democracy, they are very dissatisfied with the way it works. The figures show that around 
60% of Latinobarómetro respondents describe themselves as ‘unsatisfied democrats’. In 
contrast, barely 33% of those polled described themselves as ‘satisfied democrats’, that is 
to say that they both support the system, and believe that it works. It is important to point 
out that the 2002 survey shows that the gap in relation to indifference between democracy 
and authoritarianism is only 18%. However, what is important is that around 50% say 
that they would not mind putting up with an undemocratic government as long as the 
economy and the labour situation improve. 
 
When evaluating trust in the institutions of the state, the Congress and political parties 
suffered the greatest loss of public confidence. Support for Congress fell from 36% in 
1997 to 23% in 2002, while political parties fell from 28% to 14% over the same period. 
Despite overall support for democratic ideals, and a rejection of authoritarian alternatives, 
the majority of people are disillusioned with the way their political systems work. Neither 
the governments, nor in the wider sense the democratic process, have fulfilled people’s 
expectations in respect of the production of goods, the solving of social problems or the 
functioning of the political process itself. Dissatisfaction is general, although its political 
consequences differ from country to country. 
 
In some countries, opinion polls suggest a wish to return to strong leadership, which in 
some cases has helped former members of the military that had already tried to seize 
power, or authoritarian leaders, to take office once again, albeit this time through the 
ballot box. In other cases, the general sense of dissatisfaction has launched the careers of 
outsiders, candidates whose links to the traditional parties were either weak or non-
existent. In some cases, politicians distanced themselves from their traditional party, and 
effectively re-launched their careers, this time on the basis of populist and anti-party 
rhetoric and their own personal appeal.10 These trends are substituting what once would 
have been an openly authoritarian solution, and the growth of such trends in the coming 
years could well damage the institutions of democracy, contributing to ‘deconstruction’.11 
The elections of 2002 show a growth in these trends, as seen in cases as diverse as those 
of Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, Álvaro Uribe in Colombia, or the appearance of third 
forces in Costa Rica or Bolivia. 
 
In some countries, the party system has been weakened, and with it the credibility of 
Congress, of other democratic institutions and of politicians –both as a whole and 
                                                 
10 ‘Populism’, a widely used and ill-defined term, is used here to refer to the collection of movements and 
political trends that reject the neo-liberalist policies adopted by many countries in the region in the 1990s, 
and doing so through charismatic leaders and demagogy, i.e. nationalist economic policies, or unsustainable 
distribution of wealth. Chávez in Venezuela is a clear example of this. 
11 Nohlem, op. cit. 
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individually considered–. In some cases, this has brought about the virtual disappearance 
of many long-standing political parties, and has made it more difficult for the traditional 
representational institutions to carry out their work. A consequence has been to make 
democratic competition more uncertain and tense, representation to become more 
personalised and accountability between voters and politicians to weaken. In some cases, 
this loss of belief in elected officials has weakened the ability of the state to offer an 
effective answer to economic and social problems, mainly due to the public’s lack of 
confidence in the integrity and common sense of any action they should undertake. 
 
In spite of the low levels of confidence in the political system, 52% of Latin Americans 
said they believed that there can be no democracy without Congress or political parties. 
This figure has remained constant over the last three years (50% in 2001 and 57% in 
1999-2000), and would seem to validate the thesis held by some academics that despite 
the electorate’s hostile perception of parties and their elites, they are still seen as the only 
way to make the political system work.12 In short, the data for 2002 show that people are 
learning to distinguish between support for democracy as a system and support for those 
involved in it. Most people see the political elites as the problem, not the system per se. 
As Marta Lagos has pointed out, it is not that people are shunning democracy, rather their 
bad governments. At the centre of the question are the expectations that the governing 
elites have generated but so far failed to meet13. It would seem that a learning process is 
underway within which the electorate support the structures of democracy, but base their 
support of the governing elites increasingly on their results. 
 
Analysis of the Electoral Process in 2002 
The elections celebrated in 2002 are in large part a reflection of the political and 
economic reality of the region, both in terms of results and the way they took place. Eight 
countries held elections, and in all cases the events were well-run and well-organized. 
 
• In Costa Rica, general elections were held in February, with a second presidential 
round in April, and a first set of municipal elections, separate from the general 
election, was held in December. 
• In Nicaragua, regional elections were held on the Atlantic coast. 
• Colombia held legislative elections in March, with the presidential election in May. 
• The Dominican Republic held legislative and municipal elections in May. 
• In Bolivia, there were presidential and legislative elections in July. 
• In October, Brazil and Ecuador held general elections, with subsequent second 
rounds. 
• Peru held regional and municipal elections in November. 
 
Including second rounds where necessary, some 13 elections were held in 2002. An 
analysis of each electoral process follows. 
 
                                                 
12 Alcántara and Freidenburg. Los Partidos Políticos en América Latina. 
13 Lagos, Marta. Latinobarómetro: Informe de Prensa 2002. 
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Costa Rica 2002: the fragmentation of power and an increase in the abstention rate 
(February 3 and April 7, general elections; December 1, municipal) 
Election day, February 3, passed without incident, although a number of new aspects 
presented themselves. The presidential elections, polarized for more than half a century 
between the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), and the National Liberation Party 
(PLN), saw the emergence of a new party, the Citizens’ Action Party (PAC). For the first 
time, a ballotage or second ballot was necessary, so close was the contest. The PUSC 
candidate was Abel Pacheco, a psychiatrist and a well-known figure on the political 
scene. The PLN was represented by Rolando Araya, a long-standing figure within his 
party. PLN renegade and populist Ottón Solís stood for the PAC. The PUSC, whose 
origins lie in left-wing populism, has gradually become the party now most identified 
with neo-liberal policies, particularly during the presidency of Miguel Ángel Rodríguez. 
The PLN maintained its social-democrat profile. While the new force led by Solís 
campaigned on a platform of renewal, calling for a clampdown on corruption and a return 
to ethical values. None of the three was able to win the 40% required to win the first 
round. The governing PUSC party won 590,277 votes (38.6%), while the PLN managed 
475,030 votes, garnering 31%. The two candidates then went on to a second round on 
April 7. The PUSC was ahead of its rival by more than 115,000 votes in the first round, 
and won by more than 200,000 in the second, which explains the eight percentage point 
difference in the second round between the two parties. 
 
Figure 1. Costa Rica: Presidential Elections 2002, National Total 
Candidate/Party 1st Round 
(Feb-3-02) 
% 2nd Round 
(Apr-7-02) 
% 
Abel Pacheco (PUSC) 590,277 38.6 776,278 58.0 
Rolando Araya (PLN) 475,030 31.1 563,202 42.0 
Partido Acción Ciudadana 400,681 26.2 -- -- 
Movimiento Libertario 25,815 1.7 -- -- 
Renovación Costarricense 16,404 1.1 -- -- 
Others 16,553 13.0 -- -- 
Total valid votes 1,529,845 100 1,339,480 100 
Un-used 7,241 2.1 6,006 0.3 
Spoiled 32,332 0.5 27,457 2.0 
Total 1,569,418 100 1,372,942 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data provided by the TSE. 
 
While all parties suffered due to high levels of voter apathy, and of course the appearance 
of a third force, it was the PLN who lost out most. It not only lost a large number of 
votes, but was also unable to carry a single province. The PUSC won in all the country’s 
seven regions, in many with a significant majority. In relation to the elections of 1998, 
when it won 44.6% of the vote, the PLN saw its popularity fall by 13.5 points. But the 
PUSC also lost support, although to a lesser extent. Its share of the vote in the 
presidential elections increased due to the so-called hard-core of the party being joined by 
supporters attracted by Pacheco himself. However, the PAC was the ‘revelation’, not 
only for its strong performance, but because its presence increased the sense of plurality 
and brought about the need for a second round. The PLN was worst hit by the PAC’s 
appearance, given Ottón Solís’ roots in the party. Some political analysts, such as 
Rodolfo Cerdas, warned that the two main parties’ lack of credibility would not only 
divide the vote, but weaken the two-party system that Costa Rica had established over the 
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years. Time alone will tell if the 2002 elections were the result of particular 
circumstances, or the expression of a move towards greater party pluralism. 
 
The second electoral round on April 7 saw Pacheco take 58% of the vote against Araya’s 
42%. This was the first time in Costa Rican history that a second round became 
necessary, and also the first time that the PUSC won a consecutive term in office. In the 
last 50 years, only the PLN had been able to accomplish this, through the governments of 
José Figueres and Daniel Oduber (1970-74 and 1974-78) and Luis Alberto Monge and 
Oscar Arias in 1982-86 and 1986-90 respectively. 
 
An analysis of the election shows a slight increase in the abstention rate during the first 
round, with an increase in the second –31% and 39% respectively–. Some commentators 
have attributed this growth to high numbers of PAC voters failing to turn out in the 
second round, explained by the lack of a ballotage culture in Costa Rica. F. Sánchez uses 
the neologism of dis-alignment, one of the principal features of which is an increase in 
the abstention rate.14
 
As regards the parliamentary elections, it is worth pointing out that neither of the major 
parties won a Congressional majority. The legislative elections for 2002 –as with the 
presidential poll– brought 16 years of alternating governments between the PLN and the 
PUSC. As a result, Parliament is now divided into three main blocks, with the PLN 
holding 17 seats, the PUSC 19 and the PAC 14. The Libertarian Movement holds six 
seats. The number of political forces represented in Congress was also changed. Between 
1998 and 2002, seven parties were represented, but during the period 2002 to 2006, only 
five will be present in Congress. This will mean a greater need for alliances to ensure 
governability. 
 
Figure 2. Costa Rica: Composition of Parliament, 2002-04 
Party Seats % 
Partido Unidad Social Cristiana 19 33.3% 
Partido Liberación Nacional 17 29.8% 
Partido Acción Ciudadana 14 24.7% 
Movimiento Libertario 6 10.5% 
Renovación Costarricense 1 1.7% 
Total 57 100% 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano based on official data from the TSE. 
 
Figure 3. Costa Rica: 2002 Parliamentary Elections, National Total 
Party Votes % 
Unidad Social Cristiana 453,201 29.8 
Liberación Nacional 412,383 27.1 
Partido Acción Ciudadana 334,162 22.0 
Movimiento Libertario 142,152 9.3 
Renovación Costarricense 54,699 3.6 
Fuerza Democrática 30,172 2.0 
Others 95,085 6.2 
                                                 
14 Sánchez, F. Desalineamiento electoral en Costa Rica. This article was published in number 98-2002 (IV) 
of the Revista de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Costa Rica.  
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Total valid votes 1,521,854 100.0 
Blank 19,023 1.2 
Spoiled 28,461 1.8 
Total 1,569,338 100.0 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano using TSE data. 
 
The new Parliament reveals a break in voting patterns that has created a new balance of 
power. Neither the mobilization of the ‘hard-core’ PUSC vote that enabled its candidate 
to win the elections, nor the charismatic figure of Abel Pacheco persuaded PLN voters 
that did not support Araya to go over to the PUSC. The PLN, which also appealed to its 
loyal core of supporters, was similarly unable to win a parliamentary majority, as many 
of its traditional voters went over to the PAC. 
 
The interesting thing about the PAC vote is that aside from the party’s ability to attract 
voters from the PLN at both the presidential and legislative elections, it was also able to 
garner the undecided vote. The Libertarian Movement was unable to win much support 
for its presidential candidate, but fared well in the legislative elections. The three smaller 
parties, the RC, PAC, and ML, now occupy a strategic place in the parliamentary process. 
In the absence of a parliamentary majority, the PUSC must now look to the smaller 
parties for support15. The growth of the PAC and the ML’s greater number of seats mean 
that both are now in a position to influence the balance of power in parliament. 
 
For the first time, on December 1, local elections were held separately from the 
parliamentary and presidential polls16. Throughout the country’s 81 municipalities, some 
2,331,459 voters were eligible to vote for 162 deputies and 4,722 members of district 
councils. Three main characteristics emerged in the electoral process: an unprecedentedly 
high abstention rate (77.7%), the implementation of a pilot scheme for electronic voting 
and the emergence of parties operating purely at the cantonal level. Many explanations 
were offered regarding the growth of voter apathy. Aside from a general disenchantment 
with the political process and less interest in local politics than national, a number of 
other possible explanations emerged: the elections coincided with the beginning of the 
school holidays; and there had been little information about the elections or their 
importance. Fernando Zeledón pointed out in the Observatorio Electoral that it was a 
mistake to hold the elections during the rainy season –polling was suspended in the 
Caribbean province of Limón as a result– as it contributed to increase the abstention rate. 
 
In 133 of the 6,028 voting booths, an electronic system was introduced. Of the 46,241 
people eligible to use the system, 40% still opted to vote by the traditional method. The 
plan showed that the idea of voting electronically was however, viable. As a result, the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal has decided to go fully electronic in 200617. The growth of 
                                                 
15 Sánchez (2003) points out that the split vote is indicative of a drop in party royalty, and a third 
characteristic of the electoral dis-alignment that emerged during the elections.  
16 In May 1998, the government passed Law 7794, which changed the Municipal Code, allowing for the 
election of mayors on a different date to other polls at a national level. This move was aimed at 
decentralizing the state.  
17 A study by the University of Costa Rica on extending the electronic voting process showed that 94% of 
voters were in favor; 84.7% of those who had voted in this way, and 66% of the total electorate said the 
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parties functioning purely at cantonal level had been underway since 1998. In the last 
elections, 11 such parties presented mayoral and other municipal candidates; in those 
elections, for the first time, a cantonal party, the Yunta Progresista Escazuceña, gained a 
majority of seats in the municipal council and displaced the two traditional ruling parties 
in the canton. Other regional parties, such as Del Sol and Curridabat Siglo XXI, changed 
the balance of power. In 2002, the number of parties increased substantially. In the 
February election 19 local parties presented candidates, while in December 34 were 
present, although their results were not all that good. 
 
An analysis of the results according to political groupings shows that the PLN and PUSC 
candidates were the clear winners, taking 93% of the country’s 71 town halls –47 went to 
the PUSC and 28 to the PLN–. Five non-traditional parties won control of municipalities: 
Acción Ciudadana and Curridibat Siglo XXI in San José province; Independiente Obrero 
and Auténtico Paraiseño in Cartago; and Guanacaste Independiente in Guanacaste. 
 
Figure 4. Costa Rica: 2002 Municipal Elections, National Total 
Party Total 
Partido Unidad Social Cristiana 182,834 
Partido Liberación Nacional 121,649 
Movimiento Libertario 18,450 
Renovación Costarricense 14,210 
Partido Acción Ciudadana 64,681 
Otros 53,145 
Total valid votes 454,969 
Spoiled 11,922 
Un-used 5,028 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano using TSE data. 
 
The results of this election can be explained in several ways. On the one hand, the law 
does not provide for financing of parties at municipal level. At the same time, they were 
held in the same year as the presidential elections –which went to a second round–. In 
short, many parties had run out of money and their electoral teams were worn out. As a 
result, the most important factor in the elections was the lack of information provided to 
voters: no money meant that electoral programmes could not be printed, and without that, 
it was impossible to get people to attend electoral meetings. It should be said that the 
media did make an effort to inform people of what their options were however. 
 
Nicaragua: a new test for a regional system already under question (March 3rd, 
regional elections) 
At the beginning of March 2002 elections were held in the country’s two autonomous 
regions: the North Atlantic (RAAN), and the South Atlantic (RAAS). The rest of 
Nicaragua is made up of fifteen departments. The two coastal regions are hot and humid, 
and made up largely of jungle and swamp. They make up 40% of the national territory, 
with only 8% of the population –mostly indigenous peoples of the Miskito, Sumu and 
                                                                                                                                                 
system was easier to use. At the same time, 66% of voters who used the system said it was simpler. More 
than 98% were able to vote electronically within the two minutes established by the law, and only 1.2% 
were unable to meet this time frame.  
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Rama ethnic groups–. This was the fourth election held here since 1990. The overall 
climate was tense, and involvement in the elections was highlighted by voter apathy. 
 
Political life in these regions is dominated by the highly active indigenous groups, who 
although they are numerically in the minority, have been a major part of the political 
scene since the 1970s. These groups fought alongside the Sandinistas during the 
revolution, but soon fell out when the government of Daniel Ortega attempted to 
transform the political and social structure of these regions and the indigenous peoples 
reacted in order to defend their culture, beliefs and traditional forms of organization. The 
conflict cooled off when these regions won autonomy. At present, the indigenous peoples 
are trying to consolidate this process, affirm their identity and delimit their territories. 
Faced with extreme poverty and rebuilding of areas affected by natural catastrophes, they 
have put their demands to the central government and multi-lateral agencies. 
 
The March elections revealed the absence of state institutions in the regions, as well as 
the continuing after-effects of the national elections in 2001, which saw bitter conflict 
over the succession of the arch-conservative Arnaldo Alemán of the Constitutional 
Liberal Party (PLC). The first elections were focused on pacification and on the 
expectations of the indigenous peoples regarding regional autonomy. But by the third 
elections in 1998, it was clear that local people were not satisfied with the Regional 
Councils that had been established to this end. There were complaints that the national 
parties were making no effort to regulate the autonomous regimes, ignoring the demands 
of the indigenous peoples and accepting administrative corruption in the regional 
councils. This led to high abstention rates in 2002. 
 
The North Atlantic Region has an electoral roll of 199,262 voters, while the South 
Atlantic Region has 84,982 voters, of whom only 35% live in urban or semi-urban areas. 
The parties competing were the PLC, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), 
the indigenous Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka (YATAMA), and two smaller 
parties. The debate narrowed down to differences between those in favour of autonomy 
and ‘neo-integrationists’18, represented by the PLC. However, the PLC is not against 
interethnic autonomy, but believes that integration mechanisms are needed with the rest 
of the country to be able to set a national agenda. The YATAMA fights exclusively for 
the interests of the Miskito ethnic group, while the FSLN sought a compromise 
agreement. This was interpreted by many local people more as a way of scoring points at 
the PLC’s expense than as a credible option. YATAMA, which in the past had made 
alliances with the National Opposition Union (UNO) as well as the PLC, this time around 
decided to form a pact with the Sandinistas to keep the PLC out. The PLC carried the 
northern region with 35% of the vote, against the 32.9% of the Sandinistas and the 21.6% 
of YATAMA. In the south the PLC won a sufficient majority to allow it to run the 




                                                 
18 For more details, see: González, La Costa Atlántica a sus cuartas elecciones: autonomía o neo-
integración.  
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Figure 5. Nicaragua: 2002 Regional Elections, RAAN 
Party Votes % 
Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) 16,340 35.9 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) 14,961 32.9 
Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka (YATAMA) 9,837 21.6 
Partido Movimiento de Unidad Costeña (PAMUC) 3,232 7.1 
Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN) 1,106 2.4 
Total valid votes 45,476 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using CSE data. 
 
Figure 6. Nicaragua: 2002 Regional Elections, RAAS 
Party Votes % 
Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) 17,186 62.2 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) 7,315 26.5 
Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka (YATAMA) 1,726 6.2 
Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN) 1,425 5.2 
Total valid votes 27,652 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using CSE data. 
 
The PLC garnered 45.8% of the regional vote, based on 73,128 valid votes. They were 
followed by the Sandinistas with 30.5% and, in third place, the YATAMA. The 
Movement for Coastal Unity (PAMUC) won 4.4% of the vote in the North Atlantic 
Region. It did not field candidates in the south. The Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN) 
garnered 3.5% of votes. The process was attended by observers from a number of NGOs 
such as Ética y Transparencia, the Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE), 
the local Centre for Human Rights, Ciudadanos y Autonómicos, as well as the 
Organization of American States (OEA). The OEA’s Electoral Observation Mission, 
which had been set up the year before in Managua during the troubled general elections 
of November 2001, criticized several aspects of the poll. Internal difficulties within the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), particularly in relation to the matter of bringing 
witnesses to vote, sparked a crisis in the body, which was unable to reach quorum on 
many important decisions regarding the electoral process. 
 
The OEA mission criticized the Acta de Promesa de Ley (APL), by which citizens with a 
valid identity card, but not registered to vote in their district, could still do so by 
appearing with two witnesses able to verify their address. Most parties opposed this, with 
the exception of the PLC, citing fears that outsiders would be brought into the region19. 
The report adds that discontent with the APL made the crisis in Electoral Council mre 
acute, leading to the loss of the necessary quorum just a few weeks before the election. 
The OEA mission, led by Santiago Murray, noted the weakness of the CSE, and its 
inability to reach agreements, which weakened its ability to impose its authority on the 
coming elections20. The CSE is a highly politicized body, divided between the PLC and 
the FSLN21. Finally, the OEA mission expressed its concern at the 60%-65% abstention 
                                                 
19 Unidad para la promoción de la Democracía / OEA (2002 a) 
20 Ibid 
21 In its conclusions, the Mission stated, ‘Our presence at the elections held in 2000, 2001, and on March 3, 
leads the mission to affirm that the Nicaraguan electoral process should, in the short term, be subject to a 
thorough examination and study by all those involved in the process, so that a consensus can be reached on 
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rate (which is difficult to calculate given the number of unregistered voters), and called 
on the authorities to develop mechanisms to increase participation in the autonomous 
regions22. 
 
Colombia: Elections hit by violence (March 10, legislative elections; May 26, 
presidential elections) 
The start of the election campaign coincided with the final collapse of the peace process 
initiated in 1999 by President Pastrana. Despite the creation of a non-conflict zone, the 
representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and subjected 
any negotiations to the prior adoption of what they called ‘revolutionary government 
measures.’ Without entering here into an assessment of the results of the peace process 
initiated under the Pastrana government –much was achieved, but many mistakes were 
made– most Colombians regard it as a failure. Pastrana, a Conservative in origin23, came 
to power with a clear mandate to resolve the long-running internal conflict, but by the end 
of his term in office was seen as somebody who had tried hard, but failed to engage the 
FARC in dialogue. 
 
However, conditions at home and abroad began to change regarding the narcoguerrillas. 
Pastrana succeeded in making the world see the links between the responsibility of 
consumer nations, the nature of the armed rebellion and drug-trafficking. Politicians in 
Europe and Latin America began to turn against the guerrillas. At the same time, the 
FARC, and to a lesser extent the ELN, were stepping up recruitment24, as was the regular 
army; finally managing to equal the rebels in numbers25. According to opinion polls, 
almost two thirds of the population supported US military intervention to resolve the 
conflict26. In the wake of September 11, the Bush administration showed itself willing to 
help Colombia’s counter insurgency. 
 
Everything –international context, military developments and public opinion– pointed to 
a political turning point and an escalation of the armed conflict. Álvaro Uribe, the former 
mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia, was the son of a landowner murdered by 
the FARC in the 1980s. He had built up a career through the Liberal Party. He had been 
accused while governor of working with right-wing paramilitaries through his Convivir 
rural self-defence programme for the peasantry. He had ties to the most conservative 
elements of the armed forces and landowners, but remained a member of the Liberal 
Party until the campaign to succeed Pastrana, when he began to distance himself from the 
party. Uribe called for a toughening of policy toward the guerrillas, but his party was 
reticent about this line, so he decided to stand as an independent. In short, Uribe proposed 
implementing his Convivir programme at a national level. This would involve 
                                                                                                                                                 
implementing reforms to solve the current problems facing the electoral process.  (Unidad para la 
promoción de la Democracia / OEA, 2002 b). 
22 Unidad para la promoción de la Democracia / OEA, op.cit 
23 Although Pastrana’s roots lie in the Conservative Party, the campaign that led him to the presidency was 
entitled, ‘A Grand Alliance for change.’ 
24 Falcoff, Mark. Colombia: A Questionable Choice of Objectives.  
25 Valenzuela, Arturo. La política exterior norteamericana hacía Colombia tras el fracaso del proceso de 
paz.  
26 Falcoff, op. cit 
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strengthening the army and calling on the US for aid to do so. He called for an end to 
negotiation with the insurgents and a military solution. His campaign was also based on 
the renovation of the political system through institutional reform and the fight against 
poverty. 
The official Liberal Party, the biggest in the country, proposed Horacio Serpa for the 
second time. By the end of 2001 he looked the sure winner. But the collapse of the peace 
process and his support for Pastrana changed things, leaving the field open for Uribe. The 
Conservative Party (PC) had been through an acute crisis in 2002, and its name was 
associated with the failure of the peace process. Days after the parliamentary elections, 
the head of the party, Carlos Holguín, stepped down (although he remains head of the 
party). Shortly after, presidential candidate Juan Camilo Restrepo withdrew his 
candidacy. Opinion polls gave him less than 1% of the vote. He also pointed to the 
support of many in his party for Uribe. This was the first time since 1849 that the 
Conservative Party had not presented a candidate. Instead, Uribe and Serpa both stood for 
the Liberal Party. Certain tendencies could already be seen in the legislative elections that 
would present themselves in the presidential poll two months later. While the PL 
maintained its minority, thanks to its die-hard support, the appearance of a number of 
small parties split the vote. Congress was changed by the drop in support for the two 
main parties, and the subsequent formation of coalitions. Uribe, the clear winner, but with 
no party, was the catalyst for this change. Of the 104 seats in the Senate, 20 were 
occupied by ‘Official Liberals’ who followed the party line, a third group emerged 
identified as pro-Uribe, and made up of conservatives, former leftists, indigenous parties 
and regional politicians who had begun to support him during the March elections. 
Another third remained largely independent. As Murillo has pointed out27, Uribe was the 
man to most benefit from this new makeup. The majority in Congress was a big boost to 
his proposals, particularly his ambitious aim to revoke the mandate of recently elected 
Congress members, and to reduce the number of legislators. 
 
Figure 7. Colombia: 2002 Congressional Elections, by Political Party 
Party Votes % 
Partido Liberal 2,595,640 31.3 
Partido Conservador 910,788 11.0 
Cambio Radical 316,516 3.8 
Coalición 235,339 2.8 
Equipo Colombia 192,005 2.3 
Convergencia Popular Cívica 180,914 2.2 
Apertura Liberal 162,621 2.0 
Movimiento Popular Unido 127,485 1.5 
Movimiento de Salvación Nacional 114,193 1.4 
Colombia Siempre 109,182 1.3 
Participación Popular 105,641 1.3 
Others 3,242,528 39.1 
Total valid votes 8,292,852 100 
Spoiled or un-used 1,896,077 18.6 
Total 10,188,929 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the Registraduría 
Nacional de Colombia. 
 
                                                 
27 Murillo and Fernández, Elecciones Presidenciales 2002: Un desafío a la seguridad.  
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Figure 8. Colombia: Senate, by Political Party 
Party Votes % 
Partido Liberal  2,655,855 29.1 
Partido Conservador  867,340 9.5 
Coalición  548,542 6.0 
Movimiento Nacional 413,903 4.5 
Equipo Colombia 285,102 3.1 
Movimiento Integración Popular 260,504 2.9 
Colombia Siempre 251,590 2.8 
Cambio Radical 219,801 2.4 
Movimiento Popular Unido 170,326 1.9 
Acción Laboral Moral 146,619 1.6 
Frente Social y Político 126,777 1.4 
Nueva Fuerza Democrática 121,424 1.3 
Anapo 117,615 1.3 
Others 2,937,424 32.2 
Total valid votes 9,122,822 100 
Un-used 447,575 4.4 
Spoiled 988,861 9.8 
Total 10,111,683 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data by the Registraduría 
Nacional del Estado Civil de Colombia. 
 
On the eve of the May elections, the dissident liberal candidate continued to lead the 
opinion polls, but it was still unclear what would happen in the second electoral round. 
The results confirmed what the polls had reflected: Álvaro Uribe was elected with 54% of 
the vote, followed by Serpa with 32%. Luis Garzón of Polo Democrático came third, 
beating the independent candidate Noemí Sanín. Following two consecutive elections 
that had been resolved in the second round (1994 and 1998), the 2002 elections produced 
the most convincing result since 1986. The forecasts all showed that Uribe would win in 
the first round, and indeed he won even more votes than had been thought28. 
 
Figure 9. Colombia: 2002 Presidential Elections 
Party Votes % 
Primero Colombia (Alvaro Uribe V.) 5,862,655 54.0 
Partido Liberal (Horacio Serpa U.) 3,514,779 32.4 
Polo Democrático (Luis Eduardo Garzón) 680,245 6.3 
Movimiento Si Colombia (Noemí Sanín) 641,884 5.9 
Others 155,966 1.4 
Total valid votes 10,855,529 100 
Un-used 196,116 1.7 
Spoiled 198,089 1.8 
Total 11,249,734 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prapared using data by the  Registraduría 
Nacional del Estado Civil de Colombia. 
 
Although turn out at 46.7% was low, it was the highest in a first round in many years. 
The low level of participation is an issue still to be resolved, even at the level of political 
analysis: it tends to be attributed to incomplete electoral registers, the high number of 
                                                 
28 The final poll carried out by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría gave Uribe 48%, and Serpa 32%. 
Napoleón Franco gave them 49% and 33% respectively.  
 14
displaced people due to political violence, and to the control that the insurgents have over 
certain rural areas. But beyond identifying specific causes, the exclusion of the rural 
population lies at the heart of the problem. No solution to this serious blemish on 
Colombia’s democracy is in sight. 
 
Figure 10. Colombia: Participation in the Presidential Elections, 1978-2002 





TP 36.2% 43.0% 40.4% 30.1% 26.0% 33.2% 43.4% 49.7% 46.7%
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. 
 
Other analysts say that the May 2002 elections were marked by tension and uncertainty, 
in large part produced by the rebels, who did their best to interrupt the political process 
and to confuse voters intending to vote for Uribe. However, this produced the opposite 
result, seemingly confirming the strong stance that Uribe was taking in confronting these 
groups. The presidential elections of 2002 were considered by most Colombians as a 
challenge to the armed groups. Threats of violence did nothing to dissuade people from 
voting for Uribe. Popular support for the recently elected president will be a challenge for 
Uribe, given the high expectations people have placed in him to return law and order and 
peace29. 
 
Dominican Republic: The PRD – from consolidation to dominance? (May 16: 
legislative and municipal elections) 
Almost four million Dominicans were eligible to vote for 32 senators, 150 deputies, 125 
mayors, 787 local councillors, and as many more deputies in elections that presented 
11,000 candidates. As happens year after year, the traditional parties –the Dominican 
Revolutionary Party (PRD), the Party for Dominican Liberation (PLD), and the Social 
Reformist Christian Party (PRSC)– took almost all votes. Nevertheless, some changes 
can be seen in the elections. Dominican politics was dominated during the second half of 
the twentieth century by Joaquín Balaguer, Juan Bosch and José Francisco Peña Gómez. 
The first, the leader of the PRSC, and the second, from the PRD (Bosch founded the 
party in 1939, and then left to form the PLD). Peña Gómez took over the PRD following 
Bosch’s departure, and was its leader until he died. Despite their age, Balaguer and Bosch 
showed no signs of flagging, and the two strongmen pulled in the votes election after 
election. Bosch died in 2001, followed by Balaguer a year later. He had been president 
seven times, and was a candidate in the 2000 elections despite his 94 years of age. Peña 
Gómez was the leader most in touch with the masses. After several attempts to win the 
presidency, he died only days after the 1998 elections. 
 
In the 2002 elections, Balaguer, who had been the last surviving strongman in Dominican 
politics, was also absent. His death opened a crisis within the PRSC. The party had 
emerged in 1985 from the fusion of the traditional Reformist Party and the Social 
Christian Revolutionary Party. But his death sparked a debate on the need for renovation. 
But so far, no clear sign of a new direction had emerged that would allow it to present 
itself as a credible electoral choice. But Bosch’s PLD was also plunged into crisis, and 
                                                 
29 Murillo, op. cit. 
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now led by former president Leonel Fernández. With the death of their two legendary 
leaders, both parties were seriously weakened. The country had been showing strong 
growth for five years, and the governing PRD had consolidated its hold on power. It was 
no coincidence that three days after the death of Balaguer, Congress approved the re-
introduction of a law allowing incumbent presidents to run for a second term. The way 
was open for Mejía. 
 
Throughout 2001, the PRD was occupied in reforming the Constitution. Following the 
reform of 1994 and changes to the electoral law of 1997 and 1998, it was believed that 
the Constitution needed a thorough overhaul. Mejía’s objective was to extend parliament 
until 2004, thus allowing legislative and presidential elections to take place at the same 
time, as well as to restore presidential re-election.. However, the PLD and the PRSC, as 
well as many in the PRD, opposed allowing presidents to stand for more than one term of 
office. 
 
Mejía formed a Constitutional Reform Commission represented by all political parties, as 
well as other civic organizations, and coordinated by a representative of the Catholic 
Church. The three main parties eventually agreed on the extension of parliament, but 
rejected presidential re-election. Nevertheless, in December of that year, the president 
persuaded Parliament to change the law. But a wave of protests, as well as fears of the 
possible international repercussions persuaded the Supreme Court to annul the proposal. 
The ‘counter-reform’ did not affect the PRD’s electoral results. And they won 42.2% of 
the legislative vote, and 41.4% of the municipal. The PLD came second, more than 10 
points behind, but it did manage to take the capital –a traditional PRD stronghold–. For 
the first time, the left presented a single candidate, heading a 12-party coalition with three 
tickets: 16, the Polo Político MIUCA-Partido Comunista del Trabajo; 18, the Fuerza de la 
Revolución; and 19, the Partido Nueva Alternativa-Partido de los Trabajadores 
Dominicanos. Although they did not do well, they set a precedent. Following the victory 
of the PRD in the legislative and municipal elections of 1998, and the presidential poll of 
2000, the party consolidated itself in its majority position, having won 27 of the 32 
provinces in the country. 
 
Figure 11. Dominican Republic: 2002 Elections, National Total 
Party Congress % Municipal % 
P. Revolución Dominicana (PRD) 963,735 42.2 942,820 41.4 
P. Reformista Social Cristiano 
(PRSC) 
556,431 24.4 607,491 26.6 
Partido Liberación Dominicana 
(PLD) 
657,658 28.8 611,732 26.8 
Others 105,585 4.6 117,662 5.2 
Total valid votes 2,283,409 100 2,279,705 100 
Spoiled and un-used 88,182 3.7 87,064 3.7 
TOTAL 2,371,591 100 2,366,769 100 






Figure 12. Dominican Republic: Electoral Participation, 2002 
 Congress % Municipal % 
Total eligible voters 4,594,941 100 4,644,791 100 
Total number of votes 2,371,591 51.6 2,366,769 50.9 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the JCE. 
 
Participation rose by about 1 percentage point on the previous elections (presidential 
elections tend to attract around two thirds of the electorate), despite a campaign to 
encourage people to vote. Many attributed the low turn out, correctly in all probability, to 
the lack of interest that most Dominicans feel toward the legislative elections generally. 
 
Despite the presence of international observers, differences still arose between supporters 
of the candidates30. A bulletin issued early in the process that annoyed all parties brought 
about the closure of the counting process for several hours by the National District 
Electoral Board. Despite this, there were no major incidents, and in general terms, order 
was maintained at all the voting centres, both rural and urban. For the first time a system 
using a closed, but unblocked ballot was used. Until the 1998 elections, the ballots had 
been blocked. This time around voters used the ‘preferential’ system, whereby they made 
their choice from a list of candidates provided by each party31. 
 
Voters in the Distrito Nacional and the Province of Santo Domingo used the new system, 
marking the face of the deputy of their choice on the ballot paper. The figures for both 
areas were similar: of the 265,755 votes counted in the Distrito Nacional, 164,110 went 
for the preferential system, a percentage of 61.7%. In the province of Santo Domingo, of 
the 318,621 votes counted, 194,413 used the preferential system, or 61%. Patronage 
remains a problem, and the elections saw no reduction in the practice of handing out jobs 
or other favours to the party faithful. The three main parties are guilty of such practices, 
and this is an issue that will have to be addressed if the quality of democracy is to 
improve in the future. 
 
Bolivia: the role of ethnicity, and changes to the party system (June 30, presidential 
and legislative) 
As René Mayorga32 has pointed out, the Bolivian presidential elections of 2002 were the 
most uncertain and unpredictable in many years. Economic stagnation and growing social 
unrest led by peasant coca growers provided the catalyst for major changes to the 
political scene. First came the decision by Hugo Banzer to stand down from the 
presidency in August 2001. In May 2002 he died. This effectively brought out the 
collapse of the Nationalist Democratic Action party (AND), which the former general 
had created and led. The party, along with the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement 
(MNR) of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement of 
Jaime Paz Zamora, had dominated politics in Bolivia through a range of coalitions for 15 
                                                 
30 Both sides accused the polling stations of not filling in the necessary paperwork correctly, or of non-
tallied counts, or lack of detail regarding the preferential voting system. This situation was largely due to  
the complexity of elections with so many candidates.  
31 Manuel Morel Cerda, of the Central Electoral Borrad (JCE), described the success of the system as 
‘excepcional’, and highlighted the increased presence of women in the process compared to 1998.  
32 Mayorga, René. Las elecciones generales de 2002 y la metamorfosis del sistema de partidos en Bolivia. 
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years. This three-party domination could no longer function as before. Other parties, such 
as the Solidarity Civic Union (UCS) and CONDEPA, the Homeland Conscience, were 
lesser partners in the group. 
 
Another aspect that characterized the electoral process was the appearance of new 
political forces, and their polarization with respect to the parties that had been governing 
Bolivia for two decades –a polarization that journalists and analysts called sístémicos 
versus asistémicos. Asistémicos was used to describe those parties that define themselves 
not just for their opposition to traditional politics, but also for their populist approach to 
economic policy. The better known within these groups are those in the indigenous 
movement and the coca growers –the Movement to Socialism (MAS) of Evo Morales, the 
Pachakuti Movement of Felipe Quispe, and the New Republican Force (NFR) of Captain 
Manfred Reyes Villa–. Closely linked to this trend was the third factor that played a key 
role: the appearance of ethno-politics. What really stands out within this asístemico 
polarity is the rise of the indigenous-coca growers movement; a force that was barely felt 
during the 1997 elections, but this time round garnered one third of votes. Its leaders not 
only achieved electoral success and political representation, but also lead a protest 
movement combining activism against the mainstream parties and the market economy 
with particular demands regarding the cultivation of coca, land ownership, and 
indigenous identity. At these elections, they succeeded in making their demands heard. 
 
Amid this climate of uncertainty and change, the elections broke down into a fight 
between four candidates, none of which had the advantage, although most surveys put 
Manfred Reyes Villa of the NFR, a former member of the military and mayor of 
Cochabamba, ahead. He was also known for his criticism of the decision by the former 
president Sánchez de Lozada to privatize state enterprises. The results were a surprise: 
the winner was Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR with 22.46% of the votes, 
followed by Evo Morales of the MAS, and who had been last in the pre-election surveys. 
Sánchez de Lozada’s 22% and the 21% garnered by Morales show how split the vote 
was. Reyes Villa came third with a minimally smaller number of votes. Overall 
participation was the same as in previous contests, with 72% of eligible voters turning 
out. This percentage was slightly lower than the elections of the 1980s. 
 
Figure 13. Bolivia: 2002 General Elections, National Total 
Party Votes % 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) 624,126 22.46 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 581,884 20.94 
Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR) 581,163 20.91 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) 453,375 16.31 
Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti (MIP) 169,239 6.09 
Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS) 153,210 5.51 
Others 215,811 7.76 
Total valid votes 2,778,808 100 
Un-used 130,685 4.37 
Spoiled 84,572 2.82 
Total 2,994,065 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the CNE. 
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Figure 14. Bolivia: Electoral Participation, National Total, 2002 
Total eligible voters  4,155,055 100 
Total number of votes 2,994,065 72.05 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the CNE. 
 
Congress was given a clean sweep with a new broom. The results of the elections (the 
total of plural nominations –from the general vote, and the single nominations, elected in 
each electoral district–) shows that if the MNR and the MIR together make up 39% of the 
presidential vote, they also add up to 48% of the deputies, and 61.5% of senators. The 
disproportionate advantage achieved by the two traditional parties marked a milestone33. 
According to the Bolivian Constitution, Congress elects the president of the republic 
from between the two first majorities in the event that neither candidate won an absolute 
majority. The new Congress members, who gathered on August 4, elected Sánchez de 
Lozada thanks to an alliance between the MNR, most of the MIR, and the lesser partners 
of the AND and UCS, adding up to 84 votes out of 156 (that is to say, 54%). Evo Morales 
won the support of 43 Congress members (27% of the total) from the MAS, MIP, and 
other leftists. 
 
This unprecedented result was a clear sign of the arrival of ethno-politics in Bolivia: 
when most of the indigenous members of Congress (25%) arrived to take their oath, they 
wore their traditional dress, and refused to speak Spanish; making long speeches in 
Aymara and Quechua. Congress members of the winning coalition had to find 
interpreters at the last minute to be able to follow proceedings. The NFR decided to annul 
their vote, supporting Reyes Villa, despite him not having made it through to the second 
round. 
 
Figure 15. Bolivia: Composition of Congress, 2002 
Party Deputies % Senators % 
M. Nac. Revolucionario (MNR) 36 27.7 11 42.3 
Mov. al Socialismo (MAS) 27 20.8 7 26.9 
M. Izq. Revolucionaria (MIR) 26 20.0 5 19.2 
N. Fza. Republicana (NFR) 25 19.2 2 7.7 
M.I. Pachacuti (MIP) 6 4.6 -- -- 
U. Cívica Solidaridad (UCS) 5 3.8 -- -- 
A. Dem. Nacionalista (ADN) 4 3.1 1 3.8 
P. Socialista (PS) 1 0.8 -- -- 
Total 130 100 26 100 






                                                 
33 For Mayorga, the data shows that the collapse of the three-way power sharing of the MNR, MIR, and 
ADN did not bring about the collapse of the respective parties, nor of the political system. And while the 
three-way arrangement disappeared, the MNR and the MIR still retained their relevancy, so much so that 
they were the driving force behind the coalition government. The MNR won the elections with 22.4% of 
the vote, garnering 47 seats, while the MIR was the third force, with 31 seats out of the total of 157.  
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Figure 16. Bolivia: Congressional Elections 






M. Nac. Revolucionario (MNR) 47 -- -- 
M. Izq. Revolucionaria (MIR) 27 2 2 
U. Cívica Solidaridad (UCS) 5 -- -- 
A. Dem. Nacionalista (ADN) 5 -- -- 
Mov. Al Socialismo (MAS) -- 34 -- 
M.I. Pachacuti (MIP) -- 6 -- 
N. Fuerza Republicana (NFR) -- -- 27 
P. Socialista (PS) -- 1 -- 
Total 84 43 29 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. 
 
As noted above, the election reveals a number of important changes in voting 
composition. But these changes did not particularly affect the traditional parties of the 
MNR and the MIR, who put together the coalition that still governs in Bolivia. Instead, it 
was the opposition that was most affected. Aside from the collapse of AND, and the rise 
of the NFR –something which some analysts attribute to their respective leaders’ links to 
the military– we see that CONDEPA and UCS, both of which are built around their 
charismatic leaders, saw their presence fall dramatically. 
 
Mayorga argues that the main change to the party system lies not so much in the form of 
things, as in the emergence of a new ‘asystemic’ populism, which takes over from the 
previous version. His analysis does not underestimate, however, the underlying causes for 
the rise of indigenous politics34. An important effect of these elections was a territorial 
redistribution, and the regionalization of the vote. Although the MNR and the MIR (the 
latter to a lesser degree) are national parties, these elections produced a territorial break in 
two important regions: the relative majority of the MAS in four of the five departments 
where the indigenous population is concentrated, and the relative victory of the MNR in 
the eastern and Amazonian departments35. 
 
Figure 17. Bolivia: Changes in the Party System 
Party 1997 2002 Difference 
A. Dem. Nacionalista (ADN) 22.26 3.39 -18.87 
M.Nac.Revolucionario (MNR) 18.20 22.46 +4.26 
M.Izq.Revolucionaria (MIR) 16.76 16.31 -0.45 
Conciencia de Patria (Condepa) 17.16 0.37 -16.79 
U.Cívica Solidaridad (UCS) 16.11 5.51 -10.60 
Mov. al Socialismo (MAS) -- 20.94 +20.94 
M.I.Pachacuti (MIP) 0.84 6.09 +5.25 
N.Fza.Republicana (NFR) -- 20.91 +20.91 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. 
 
These new realities challenge the ability of Sánchez de Lozada to govern. Although the 
MNR and the MIR are still important, they saw their vote increase after all, the rise of the 
                                                 
34 For an in-depth analysis of the effects of the 2002 elections on the Bolivian party system, see Mayorga 
(2002) and Lazarte (2002), both of whom draw very different conclusions: the first emphasizing continuity, 
and the latter, change.  
35 Mayorga. Op. cit 
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MAS and MIP, which come from a different political culture to the ‘democratic pact’ that 
characterized politics until now. This raises many questions, particularly because these 
parties are also involved in social protest, which at times has been violent, and because 
they are closer to the logic and dynamic of a protest movement than they are to the 
practices of institutional party politics. 
 
The first months of the new government did not provide any auspicious signs that these 
groups were about to change in their outlook and approach; if this tendency persists, then 
one can only hope that the coalition supporting the presidency is able to provide stability. 
 
Brasil: Finally, the left wins office (October 6, first round of presidential, state, and 
legislative elections, October 27, second round) 
There are 115 million voters in Brazil, and the general elections in the world’s eighth-
largest economy saw 1,656 posts up for renewal, starting with the president’s job, as well 
as 513 deputies, 64 senators, 27 governors, and 1,050 local legislators. The government 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso had made some mistakes, but he was one of the few 
presidents in the region in recent years to leave office with a relatively high popularity 
rating. The elections would not only determine the future for Brazil, but they would also 
have hemispheric repercussions, encapsulating the image of the continent following the 
collapse of Argentina.  
 
Brazilian politics is complex, and characterized by a wide range of parties operating 
solely at the regional level. These elections brought changes to the coalitions that had 
dominated politics during the 1990s. In the two previous elections, won by Cardoso, the 
fight was polarized between his wide-ranging center-right coalition and the Workers 
Party (PT) candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who had stood each time since 1989, 
increasing his support over the years, and winning 31% of the vote in 1998.  
 
By 2002 the PT had matured, accumulating experience over the years through regional 
and municipal administrations. The coalition built around Lula took in all the parties of 
the left, and included a Liberal running mate. This was effectively a announcement of the 
ample support it would have in parliament, backed by the explicit recommendation of 
former presidents Sarney and Franco. At the same time, it was clear that the coalition 
around Cardoso was collapsing fast.  
 
The break with the Liberal Front Party (PFL), and a clash with the conservative senator 
Magalhaes, as well as arguments over the pre-candidacy of Roseanna Sarney, and 
differences with huge numbers of PMDB supporters, all generated problems that 
weakened the long-standing coalition. Two center-left candidates, Ciro Gomes and 
Anthony Garotinho presented a minor threat to Lula. On election day, Lula won an 
important victory, garnering 46.4% of the vote, leaving his nearest rival Serra in second 
place with 23.2%. Garotinho was a surprise third place, winning eight%, while Ciro came 






Figure 18. Brazil: 2002 Presidential Elections, National Total 
Candidate/Party 1st Round
(Oct-6-02)
% 2nd Round 
(Oct-27-02) 
%
Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, PT-PL 39,454,692 46.4 52,793,364 61.3
José Serra, PSDB-PMDB 19,705,061 23.2 33,370,739 38.7
Anthony Garotinho, PSB 15,179,879 17.9 -- --
Ciro Gomes, PPS-PDT-PTB 10,170,666 12.0 -- --
José Maria, PSTU 402,232 0.5 -- --
Rui Costa Pimenta, PCO 38,619 0.0 -- --
Total valid votes 84,951,149 100 86,164,103 100
Un-used 2,873,720 3.0 1,727,760 1.9
Spoiled 6,976,107 7.4 3,772,138 4.1
Total 94,804,126 100 91,664,259 100
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the TSE. 
 
In the second round, which took place three weeks later, Lula won 61% of the vote, 20 
points ahead of José Serra. In the end, Lula won the support of most of the Brazilian 
political elite, including Gomes and Garotinho. Lula’s story is a fairytale come true: an 
un-educated former machinist who rises to become president of the nation. These 
elections saw a higher-than-usual turnout, even in a country where voting is obligatory. 
And even if the second round saw a slight fall off, in absolute terms, the number of valid 
votes was higher.   
 
Figure 19. Brazil: 2002 Electoral Participation, National Total 
Total eligible voters 115,253,816 100
Total number of votes – 1st Round 94,804,126 82.3
Total number of votes – 2nd Round 91,664,259 79.5
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the TSE. 
 
The legislative elections were characterized by regionalism. The PT won most seats in 
Congress, although in%age terms it gained little: 17.3% of the Senatorial vote; and 18% 
of the Congressional vote, which translated into 139 seats in Congress, and 22 in the 
Senate. This was done by a coalition of nine parties: five from the left (PSB, PDT, PPS, 
PCB, and the PV); and five from the center right (PL, PTB, PMN, PSL).  
 
But the real basis for Lula’s government lay in his potential allies, the PMDB and the 
PPB. These two centrist parties have 113 deputies between them, as well as 21 senators. 
They could support Lula in passing some of the key laws he needed to pass. By this 
calculation, Lula now had 72% of the Congress, and 64% of the Senate behind him. 
However, he cannot count on either set of allies’ unconditional support. In reality, his 
coalition is more delicate than was Cardoso’s.  
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Figure 20. Brazil: Composition of Senate, 1998–2006 
Party36 1998-2002 % 2002-06 %
PMDB 23 28.4 19 23.5
PFL 18 22.2 19 23.5
PT 8 9.9 14 17.3
PSDB 14 17.3 11 13.6
PDT 5 6.2 5 6.2
PSB 3 3.7 4 4.9
PTB 5 6.2 3 3.
PL 1 1.2 3 3.7
PPB 2 2.5 1 1.2
PPS 2 2.5 1 1.2
PSD -- -- 1 1.2
Total 81 100 81 100
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano; Alcántara Sáez (1999). 
 
Figure 21. Brazil: Composition of Congress, 1998–2006 
Party 1998-2002 % 2002-06 %
PT 59 11.5 91 17.7
PFL 110 21.4 84 16.4
PMDB 98 19.1 74 14.4
PSDB 95 18.5 71 13.8
PPB 55 10.7 49 9.6
PDT 24 4.7 21 4.1
PSB 23 4.5 22 4.3
PTB 25 4.9 26 5.1
PL 18 3.5 26 5.1
PPS 3 0.6 15 2.9
PC do B -- -- 12 2.3
PRONA -- -- 6 1.2
PSD -- -- 4 0.8
Others 3 0.6 12 2.3
Total 513 100 513 100
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano; Alcántara Sáez (1999). 
 
Opposition in both houses comes from the PSDB and the PFL, with 27% of the Congress, 
and 37% of the Senate. But it is at the state level that the governing coalition is weakest. 
The traditional parties and the opposition control the majority of states, as well as the 









                                                 
36 PMDB: Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement – PFL: Party of the Liberal Front – PT: Workers 
Party – PSDB: Party of Brazilian Social Democracy – PPB: Brazilian Progressive Party – PC do B: 
Communist Party – PPS Popular Socialist Party – PRONA: Party of the Reconstruction of the National 
Order  
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Figure 22. Brazil: States by Political Party, 2002–06 
Party States States 
PSDB 7 São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Ceará, Paraíba, Rondônia, 
Goiás y Pará 
PMDB 5 Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná, Pernambuco 
y el DF 
PFL 4 Bahia, Tocantins, Maranhão y Sergipe 
PSB 4 Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Norte y 
Alagoas 
PT 3 Mato Grosso do Sul, Piauí y Acre 
PPS 2 Amazonas y Mato Grosso 
PSL 1 Roraima 
PDT 1 Amapá 
Total 27  
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. 
 
Voter intention surveys, as in the three previous elections, accurately reflected the final 
result of an election in which 90 million people voted. In the figure that corresponds to 
the first round, on the basis of weekly averages of four pollsters, a clear tendency toward 
Lula began to show itself from the beginning37. What changed was the ‘no-Lula’ vote, 
which at different times was led by Ciro Gomes, José Serra, and Anthony Garotinho. The 
surveys generally were accurate as regards the second round, although Serra’s 
performance was better than had been predicted.  
 


































Lula 60% 63.7% 60% 58% 60% 60% 59.3% 61% 59% 57.8% 
Serra 32% 26.3% 30% 32% 31% 30% 30.8% 32% 31% 31.0% 
Blank 3% 3.3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 10%* 4% 4% 11.4%(*)
Undecided 5% 5.5% 6% 6% 5% 7% --  3% 6%  -- 
Lula-Serra 28% 37% 30% 26% 29% 30% 29% 29% 28% 27% 
(*) Includes undecided. 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. 
 
                                                 
37 We are using data from between January and October of the four main Brazilian polling companies: 
Ibope; Data Folha; Vox Populi, and CNT / Sensus.  
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Source: average weekly from Ibope, DataFolha, Vox Populi and CNT/Sensus. 
 
These elections used more than 414,000 electronic voting booths, with numbered 
keyboards to vote, and a screen showing a photograph of the candidates to help the 
illiterate. The urns were connected to the Internet to regional counting centers, as well as 
keeping their own copy. This system meant that a provisional count could be made within 
three hours of the polling stations closing, through a centralized counting system that was 
scrutinized by all parties.  
 
The key feature of the presidential elections in Brazil was a change in popular thinking 
about the chances of the left in Latin American politics. As Paramio38 has pointed out, the 
triumph of the PT, with more than 60% of the second round vote, would seem to suggest 
that a similar shift to the left could take place in future elections. The enormous 
economic, political, and demographic importance of Brazil within Latin America means 
that Lula’s win will have had a similarly enormous influence on the political process 
throughout the continent. It also means that his presidency will be under considerable 
scrutiny39.   
 
Ecuador: a return to democracy and a split vote (October 20, legislative and 
municipal, as well as first round of presidential elections – second round November 
24) 
Amid a climate of crisis, eleven candidates ran for the presidency: the largest number of 
candidates since 1992. On October 20, Ecuadorians were to elect deputies, provincial and 
municipal councillors, mayors, and deputies to the Andean Parliament.  
 
                                                 
38 See Paramio’s análisis: Perspectivas de la Izquierda en América Latina. Real Instituto Elcano working 
papers, 2003.  
39 Ibid.  
 25
Ecuador is one of the poorest countries in the Americas, and has been in crisis for several 
years. In 2000, the economy went over to the dollar. But even if this halted inflation, it 
also saw a drastic fall in the income of the country’s poorest. Protest and economic 
demands were articulated by a new force, the indigenous movement, who claim to 
represent 50% of the population. They had already shown their clout by overthrowing 
president Mahuad in January 2000.  
 
Since that time, the country has been undergoing an institutional transformation under 
Vice-President Gustavo Noboa. The remains of the former system that was run from 
Quito and Guayaquil fought for a place alongside new formations and parties based on 
personalities. As a result of the economic and social crisis, the indigenous movement was 
able to dominate the elections.  
 
The key feature of the elections was criticism of the role of the established political 
parties. Public opinion was clearly in favor of the arrival of new faces on the political 
scene. These figures had few clear policies, and their appeal lay in their personality. Few 
were in favor of reverting back to the former currency, or implementing any potentially 
traumatic measures. They were essentially, ‘anti-political’ and anti-American.  
 
There were common themes to the rhetoric of these new arrivals, but they came from 
different backgrounds, as was noted by Simón Pachano40. The only pro-business 
candidate was Alvaro Noboa, a banana magnate. Lucio Gutiérrez, who had led the 
rebellion that had overthrown Mahuad, was an intriguing mix of populist, leftist, 
nationalist, and a certain military authoritarianism.  
 
Former president Rodrigo Borja was the face of the establishment, while León Roldós 
called for a renewal of the country’s social democratic tradition. A wide range of 
ideologies was represented, but while the regional factor had been important in the last 
elections, this time round it was not a factor.  
 
According to the opinion polls, only six candidates stood any chance of winning: the four 
already mentioned, as well as Javier Neira of the Social Christian Party (PSC), Jacobo 
Bucaram of the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE). Until the last elections, the PSC, 
PRE, the Popular Democracy left-wing alliance (which had carried Mahuad to power), 
and the centre-left coalition of Democratic Left, had been consolidating their position, 
and jointly won 80% of the vote. Furthermore, they were regionally based – the first two 
along the coast, and the other two in the mountain areas. 
 
Nevertheless, for the first time since 1979, the second round of the elections saw two 
‘outsider’ candidates running for president: Gutiérrez, via the Patriotic Society Party 
(PSP), and Álvaro Noboa of the Institutional National Action Renovation Party (PRIAN). 
The two represented recently created parties, and managed to garner a little more than 
one third of votes. The traditional parties however, dominated Congress, meaning that if 
either won, they would face serious problems in forming a government and then running 
the country.  
                                                 
40 See: Pachano, Simón 
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The PSP candidate, Lucio Gutiérrez, whose party is made up mainly of former members 
of the armed forces, was supported by the Pachakutic New Country Movement of Pluri-
national Unity, which could rally the majority of peasant and indigenous organizations 
(CONAIE, FENOCIN, the Confederación del Seguro Campesino, among others), as well 
as trades unions such as CEOSL, and movements like the CMS, which was led by 
Napoleón Saltos, and the traditional left as represented by several parties whose roots lay 
in the Communist Party such as the PCE, the PCMLE, and others.  
 
The popularity of Gutiérrez among Ecuador’s poorest was largely based on his leadership 
of the indigenous-military revolt of January 2000, when for a few hours he led the 
National Salvation Junta. Gutiérrez’ campaign was built around his attacks on corruption 
and smuggling, as well as on an emotive and populist discourse. Noboa is a powerful 
businessman who was able to finance his own campaign – the most costly in the election 
– and which was largely based on the idea of transferring efficient management of a 
business to that of a country. Like Gutiérrez, he took advantage of being an outsider, and 
the poor image that traditional politicians have among voters.  
 
Six candidates won between 12% and 21% of the vote. Gutiérrez and Noboa went 
through to the second round one month later. Gutiérrez was the surprise of the election, 
with no opinion polls predicting his victory. León Roldós, vice-president under Osvaldo 
Hurtado, came third, heading an unlikely alliance of socialists, former conservatives and 
Christian Democrats. The PSC and PRE came fifth and sixth respectively, after Borja. 
 
Figure 25. Ecuador: 2002 Presidential Elections, National Total 
Candidate/Party 1st Round 
(Oct-20-02) 
% 2nd Round 
(Nov-24-02) 
% 
PSP/MUPP-NP (Gutiérrez Borbúa) 943,123 20.64 2,803,243 54.79 
PRIAN (Noboa Pontón) 794,614 17.39 2,312,854 45.21 
RP (Roldós Aguilera) 703,593 15.40 -- -- 
ID (Borja Ceballos) 638,142 13.97 -- -- 
PSC (Neira Menéndez) 553,106 12.11 -- -- 
PRE (Bucaram Ortíz) 544,688 11.92 -- -- 
Others 391,916 8.58 -- -- 
Total valid votes 4,569,182 100 5,116,097 100 
Un-used 483,905 9.13 640,074 11.02 
Spoiled 245,494 4.63 50,938 0.88 
Total 5,298,581 100 5,807,109 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the TSE. 
 
The polls clearly pointed to the need for a second round, but they failed to take into 
account the technical draw, as well as the split vote. Many people thought right up until 
the last moment that former president Borja would be in the recount, but he ended up 
fourth. In the second round the polls were right to put Gutiérrez ahead; he took 55% of 
the vote, but they underestimated Noboa’s poor performance.  
 
The last poll carried out by a company called Informe Confidencial was based on 1,200 
interviewees. This gave Gutiérrez 55.5% of the vote, and Noboa 20%. The Cedatos-
Gallup poll showed 45% for Gutiérrez, and 30% for Noboa. The analysts say that the 
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regional factor was not important in the second round, although there is no data to show 
to what extent this diminished. It may well be that it played a role, given that Noboa is 
from the coast, where 49% of the electorate live, and Gutiérrez from the mountain 
regions, where 47% of voters reside.  
 
In the first round, only 35% of voters turned up (2,855,000), while 13% spoiled their 
vote. This was a record, and highlights the concerns mentioned above. Participation 
increased by more than half a million votes in the second round. This was the opposite to 
what happened in the other two elections that year. The legislative elections demonstrated 
the tendency toward a split vote. The PSC won 24 of the Congress’ 100 seats, giving it 
the most, despite coming fifth in the presidential elections. It also did well in the elections 
to the Andean Parliament.  
 
Figure 26. Ecuador: 2002 Electoral Participation, National Total 
Total eligible voters 8,154,425 100 
Total number of votes – 1st Round 5,298,581 65.0 
Total number of votes – 2nd Round 5,807,109 71.2 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the TSE. 
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(1) The block representing the government is made up of 6-7 deputies; we add here a series of 
allied indigenous groups from the left, most of whom do not belong to Gutiérrez’ party. 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the TSE. 
 
The results have forced a rethink on the process of governing. The political parties, 
although weakened and in crisis, are still very much alive, and a powerful presence in 
Congress and at local level. The new distribution of parties in Congress points to the need 
for alliances and coalitions, as well as problems for a president whose support comes 













Figure 28. Ecuador: 2002 Elections to the Andean Parliament, National Total (2003-07) 
Candidate/Party Votes %
PSC  802,795 22.12
MCNP (1) 736,494 20.30
PRE  460,836 12.70
PRIAN  445,369 12.27
PSP/ MUPP-NP 365,190 10.06
MPD (2) 186,741 5.15
Others 631,339 17.40




(1) Movimiento Ciudadanos por un Nuevo País, a municipal party. 
(2) Movimiento Popular Democrático, a left-wing party that supported Gutiérrez. 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from the TSE. 
 
The second-round campaign produced a candidate who showed a willingness to reach 
agreement with a wide range of sectors, both at home and abroad, but who soon ran into 
problems with his leftist allies. The presence of members of indigenous movements in his 
government, while attempting to keep the United States and multi-lateral lending 
institutions happy, suggest a delicate balancing act will be necessary if he is to run a 
country on the edge of chaos.  
 
Given the situation it was no surprise that accusations of fraud surfaced. The main 
candidates, particularly the two that went through to the second round, reported 
irregularities in the counting process. In response, observers were sent in from the OAS 
and the European Union. Both concurred that the elections had passed off without major 
incidents, and played down the accusations of fraud, although the EU noted that a series 
of irregularities had prompted the suspension of voting in some areas41.  
 
Peru: a new regional map at the political level (November 17, regional, provincial, 
and municipal elections) 
Peru’s electoral calendar has been a busy one over the last four years, and there were 
fears of ‘voter fatigue’ at the November 17 elections. These polls would be important 
because they were to initiate a process of regionalization. The 1998 and 1999 municipal 
elections were followed by two rounds of presidential elections – and which took place 
amid accusations of fraud on the part of then-president Fujimori. These were repeated in 
2001, with another two rounds of presidential elections.  
 
The process of regionalization began the day before the election with the passing of a law 
to this end by the president. This created 25 new regions that corresponded to the 24 
departments and the El Callao Constitutional Province that existed previously. Their 
names have been kept, along with their territorial demarcations, but regional governors 
                                                 
41 In the first round, the elections were postponed in the cantons of Guayas (Naranjito, after urns were 
Burned, and in Palestina due to a widespread boycott of the election), in the parish of Cojimíes and in the 
canton of Pedernales, as well as in one polling station in the canton of Tosagua en Manabí (boycott in the 
first and protests in the second after papers were found that had previously been marked). For more details 
see: European Union Electoral Misión in Ecuador, 2002.  
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will now administer them. Furthermore, the larger regions will also acquire new 
responsibilities and some degree of fiscal autonomy. From a political point of view, the 
aim is to take the pressure off the central government. Peru’s centralist tradition has 
always placed considerable responsibility in the president. Behind the measures lies the 
belief that a greater role for the regions in the political process will improve government.  
 
The elections on November 17 would see the appointment of 25 new presidents and vice-
presidents of the newly created regions, along with 229 members of regional councils, 
and who would be charged with the job of decentralizing the country. These elections 
would also differ from the 1998 polls under Fujimori in that there would be no second 
round. Mayors would be decided simply on the basis of the most votes.  
 
The 25 new regional governments were elected before the law regulating them had been 
implemented. Congress had already approved it, but the cabinet had not ratified it. 
Despite this, the regional elections took place without incident. Observer missions, 
among them one from the Organization of American States, highlighted the good 
organization and running of the electoral process.  
 
The elections were a complicated affair. There were 1,634 district councillors (among 
them mayors), 194 provincial councillors, and for the first time, the direct election of 
regional councillors, with a president, vice president, and councillor. This represented 
12,138 municipal authorities, among them mayors and aldermen, as well as 278 at 
regional level, among them presidents, vice-presidents, and councillors for the 25 
regions. In all, 105,000 candidates divided between thousands of lists.  
 
The outcome was that APRA won 24.1% of the vote, followed by Possible Peru (PP) 
with 13.5% of votes, trailed by the National Unity party (UN – an alliance that includes 
the Social Christians) with 8.6%. It is not easy to identify a clear winner. Perhaps this 
was the opposition APRA, which now controls 12 of the 25 regions. But its vote at all 
other levels was much lower.  
 
A clear loser did emerge though. This was the PP, the part of the president. It won only 
one region, and came fourth in the provincial and district polls. In Lima, Luis Castañeda 
of National Action – an alliance that includes the Popular Christian Party, as well as other 
lesser forces) won, beating off Alberto Andrade of We are Peru, and who failed to go 
through to the second round. Participation was higher than expected, despite the ‘voter 
fatigue’ mentioned earlier. Around 84% of voters turned out. This was higher than 
expected, given that these were local elections, and little information was available to 









Figure 29. Peru: 2002 Local Elections, National Total 
Party Regional % Provincial % District %
Partido Aprista Peruano  1,800,563 24.1 1,300,822 12.1 966,065 13.1
Perú Posible 1,007,405 13.5 834,114 7.8 532,126 7.2
Alianza Unidad Nacional 643,859 8.6 1,900,371 17.7 1,103,352 15.0
Somos Perú 466,102 6.2 1,575,415 14.7 1,113,751 15.1
Acción Popular 441,390 5.9 512,643 4.8 337,748 4.6
Unión por el Perú – F. 
Amplio 
418,046 5.6 245,667 2.3 174,105 2.4
Fuerza Democrática 234,613 3.1 242,092 2.3 128,691 1.7
Movimiento Nueva 
Izquierda 
215,239 2.9 217,500 2.0 129,884 1.8
Alianza para el Progreso 207,110 2.8 137,206 1.3 66,830 0.9
Renacimiento Andino 130,406 1.7 154,652 1.4 112,597 1.5
Frente Indep. Moralizador 102,735 1.4 90,922 0.8 51,387 0.7
Others 1,800,534 23.2 3,375,365 31.4 2,536,632 34.4
Total valid votes 7,468,002 100 10,745,502 100 7,367,878 100
Un-used 565,623 6.5 1,127,808 8.8 639,163 7.3
Spoiled 715,375 8.2 952,609 7.4 752,446 8.6
Total 8,749,000 100 12,825,919 100 8,759,487 100
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from Fernando Tuesta 
Soldevilla of the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE). 
 
Figure 30. Peru: 2002 Electoral Participation, National Total 
Participation Region % Province % District %
Total eligible voters 10,525,040 100 15,293,397 100 10,374,056 100
Total number of votes 8,749,000 83.1 12,825,919 83.9 8,759,487 84.4
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from Fernando Tuesta 
Soldevilla of the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE). 
 
The local nature of the elections favoured a split among voters, unlike in the 2001 
presidential elections, when four parties garnered 96.4% of the vote. This time around, 
the four-most voted parties won an average of 52.4% in the provincial and district 
elections.  
 
The elections show that all the national parties saw their ability to act seriously curtailed, 
with the appearance of new forces and personalities from the regions, who now control 
28% of the regions, and more than 40% of the provinces and districts. Another 
characteristic of the new map is that while a wide range of parties hold posts at national, 












Figure 31. Peru: A New Regional Political Map 
Party Region % Province % District % 
Partido Aprista Peruano  12 48.0 34 17.5 199 12.2 
Perú Posible 1 4.0 12 6.2 192 11.8 
Alianza Unidad Nacional -- -- 12 6.2 140 8.6 
Somos Perú 1 4.0 19 9.8 143 8.8 
Acción Popular -- -- 11 5.7 104 6.4 
Unión por el Perú – F. 
Amplio 
2 8.0 6 3.1 34 2.1 
Fuerza Democrática -- -- 3 1.5 36 2.2 
Movimiento Nueva Izquierda 1 4.0 3 1.5 28 1.7 
Alianza para el Progreso -- -- -- 0.0 17 1.0 
Renacimiento Andino -- -- 5 2.6 27 1.7 
Frente Indep. Moralizador 1 4.0 2 1.0 19 1.2 
Others 7 28.0 87 44.8 695 42.5 
Total 25 100 194 100 1,634 100 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from Fernando Tuesta 
Soldevilla of the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE). 
 













Partido Aprista Peruano  92% 24.1 93.8% 12.1 89.3% 13.1 
Perú Posible 88% 13.5 92.8% 7.8 92.2% 7.2 
Alianza Unidad Nacional 88% 8.6 83% 17.7 71.8% 15.0 
Somos Perú 80% 6.2 64.4% 14.7 53.8% 15.1 
Acción Popular 72% 5.9 79.4% 4.8 67.3% 4.6 
Unión por el Perú – F. Amplio 52% 5.6 38.7% 2.3 26.9% 2.4 
Fuerza Democrática 36% 3.1 24.7% 2.3 20% 1.7 
Movimiento Nueva Izquierda 64% 2.9 52% 2.0 31% 1.8 
Alianza para el Progreso 16% 2.8 14.4% 1.3 9.8% 0.9 
Renacimiento Andino 24% 1.7 27.3% 1.4 21.5% 1.5 
Frente Indep. Moralizador 8% 1.4 11.3% 0.8 12.2% 0.7 
(a) Extent of participation of party at regional, provincial and district level. 
(b) Results obtained. 
Source: Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano. Prepared using data from Fernando Tuesta 
Soldevilla of the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE). 
 
As can be seen from the previous figure, which compares the national presence of parties 
with the number of votes obtained, only the APRA, the PP, and to a lesser extent 
National Unity, can claim a real presence at national level. A second group of parties has 
a limited presence on the national stage, and then there is a third group of parties (not 
included in this figure) who are active only at the local level. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In general, all the elections reflect the political and economic crisis that has hit the region. 
A key feature has been that voters have turned away from the traditional parties, and 
opted for new forces. A mix of a ‘punishment vote’ and frustration seems to have been 
the attitude of many, and this has created some unexpected results, both for the 
democratic process and then for the ability of the president to govern42.  
                                                 
42 See: Paramio, L. Frustración de los electores y crisis de la democracía.  
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In Bolivia and Ecuador, the ethnic question took on unprecedented relevance. There was 
no indication that Evo Morales, the leader of the coca-growing peasants, would reach 
second place, and few believed that Lucio Gutiérrez, the former coup leader with leftist 
leanings would sweep the board in Ecuador. In both cases, the indigenous movements are 
at the root of the success of the presidential candidates. Ethno-politics has arrived as a 
force to be reckoned with in Latin American politics.  
 
In both cases, it is clear that voters have punished the traditional parties that had 
previously dominated the system. In Ecuador, Gutiérrez was not only a new candidate 
facing off against the established political class. He also had a reputation for being close 
to the people thanks to his role in the coup that overthrew Jamil Mahuad in January 2000. 
His victory is largely due to the disappointment of an electorate that has not shared in the 
benefits of economic growth (60% of the population lives below the poverty line), and 
that is looking for a leader to address their needs.  
 
In Bolivia, the parties that for two decades dominated the political system have now been 
replaced by new forces supported by the majority indigenous and mixed race sections of 
the population. Protest politics, largely led by the Aymara and Quechua peoples, has 
become a political force to contend with.  
 
From now on, the system created by the MNR, the MIR, and the AND, and which had 
been the basis for many coalitions, was no longer guaranteed. Two new parties, the MAS 
of Evo Morales, and the NFR of Manfred Reyes Villa43, would join with two of the 
traditional forces to constitute the new scenario, with all the challenges this presupposes 
for the running of the country.  
 
In Brazil, Lula’s victory reflected an important change in priorities for a large part of the 
electorate. Lula was able to forge alliances across a wide range of the political spectrum, 
and also allay fears about his leftist origins. But the real reason for his victory was that 
voters wanted a candidate that would address the country’s grave social problems rather 
than simply promising economic growth.  
 
Lula’s campaign addressed such basic issues as reducing poverty, social inequality, and 
hunger. This struck a chord with an electorate worn down by economic problems. At the 
same time, as Paramio44 has pointed out, the victory of Lula in Brazil will have changed 
attitudes about the chances of the left in politics in Latin America.  
 
In Colombia, a dissident from the Liberal Party – which has traditionally alternated 
power with the Conservative Party – won the presidency in the first round. Álvaro 
Uribe’s campaign presented him as a strong candidate prepared to take on the guerrillas 
following the failure of his predecessor to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the armed 
activists. The Colombian example shows the frustration of a population worn down by a 
                                                 
43 See analysis by Lazarte and Mayorga referred to in bibliography 
44 See analysis by Paramio, L. Perspectivas de la izquierda en América Latina. Op. cit.  
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conflict that has damaged not only the economy, but also made life hard for many people, 
and which previous administrations had been unable to resolve.  
 
The results of the parliamentary elections, held two months before the presidential poll, 
were tough on the traditional parties. They then lost further support. Many of the Liberal 
and Conservative candidates sympathized with Uribe, or followed his lead to declare 
themselves independents. The Conservative Party did badly, and was riven by internal 
fighting.  
 
The electoral results in Costa Rica are another example of the loss of appeal that 
traditional parties have suffered, as well as a growing apathy on the part of the electorate 
toward national politics. The winner early on was clearly going to be Ottón Solís, the 
National Liberation Party (PLN) dissident. The Citizens’ Action Party (PAC) emerged to 
take 25% of the vote, taking away support from the traditional parties, with the result that 
the Parliament was split between several smaller parties.  
 
For the first time, a presidential election went through to a second round in Costa Rica. 
The winner was Abel Pacheco of the Christian Social Unity Party (PUSC). His victory 
was attributed in part to the split vote. The National Liberation Party (PLN) was the big 
loser in the elections. Another first was the holding of local elections on a separate date to 
the presidential poll. Voters were generally disinterested, and turn out was the lowest 
ever. A new electronic voting system was successfully tried out during the elections.  
 
The Peruvian regional elections saw the first elections after the creation of 25 new 
regions; part of a process of decentralization that will devolve administrative and fiscal 
power to the regions. The elections produced a high turnout. The vote was split, and the 
ruling party was only able to win one of the regions. APRA benefited most from the split 
vote, winning 12 regions, although its overall vote was lower than in previous polls.  
 
Two aspects stand out in the elections held in the Dominican Republic: the worsening 
crisis in the PRSC following the death of Joaquín Balaguer in 2002. At the same time, the 
PRD strengthened its position, and is now the major political force in the country. These 
elections also saw the use of a new closed, but unblocked ballot paper, allowing voters to 
exercise their preference from a list of candidates for each party.  
 
Finally, the regional elections in Nicaragua were dominated by indigenous movements. 
Turn out was very low, and organization suffered as a result of the crisis within the 
Supreme Electoral Council.  
 
An overall analysis reveals the following key characteristics: with the exception of 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, turn out was the same as in previous years. In Colombia, a 
country with a traditionally low turn out on polling day, 42.9% of the electorate voted in 
the parliamentary elections, and 46.5% in the presidential elections. This is slightly 
higher than at the last elections (44% and 41% respectively). 
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Brazil, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic maintained traditional voter participation 
levels. Peru saw an 80% participation, while in Ecuador; the first round brought a poor 
turn out, although the second round produced a record number of participants. 
 
Figure 33. Electoral Participation, 2002 
Country Type of Election Electoral Participation 2002 
(%) 
Bolivia General June 30 72 
Brazil General (1st round) October 6 
Presidential (2nd round) October 27 
82 
80 
Colombia Legislatives March 10 
Presidential May 26 
43 
46 
Costa Rica General (1st round) February 3 
Presidential (2nd round) April 7 




Ecuador General (1st round) October 20 









Legislative and municipal May 16 51 
 
Second rounds were necessary in every presidential election except for Colombia, where 
Uribe won in the first round. In Costa Rica, the emergence of a third force that attracted a 
lot of votes forced a second round. This was the first time this had been necessary.  
 
In Bolivia, the presidential race was so close that Congress had to appoint the winner.   
 
With the exception of Brazil, every election saw the emergence of new electoral forces. 
As noted earlier, these new parties won support from large sectors of an electorate long-
tired with the traditional forces. This was particularly the case with Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Costa Rica, with the corresponding changes to the make up of their 
Congresses and the challenges fragmentation will bring to the process of government.  
 
Another outcome of most of the elections held in 2002 was a change in the composition 
of Congress. In Costa Rica, three main parties won more or less equal numbers of seats, 
with a smaller, fourth party able to swing the balance in any negotiations. In Ecuador, the 
governing party did not win a majority, and Congress is still controlled by the traditional 
parties. This will create problems for the government in pushing through its program.  
 
Brazil is used to the presence of a large number of parties in Congress, as well as at the 
regional level. Lula’s victory did not however give his party a strong presence in 
Congress or at regional level, which will mean the need for alliances and coalitions 
across the political spectrum. A similar situation exists in Colombia and Bolivia, with 
particular emphasis on the impact of ethnic-based parties on the composition of 




In short, the main characteristics in most countries were higher abstention rates, popular 
support for new candidates and parties, a reduction in support for traditional parties, 
presidential contests going to a second round, and the fragmentation of most Congresses. 
These trends are clearly linked to the sense of disappointment that most electorates felt at 
their governments’ inability to improve living conditions, all of which contributed to a 
growing frustration with politicians.  
 
This same failure also largely explains the inability of the parties to respond to the 
realities of most people’s lives. The traditional parties have been losing support steadily 
over recent years. Their loss of credibility opens the way for ‘independent’ candidates 
looking to distance themselves from the traditional parties, but who do not necessarily 
help create enduring political institutions. It is to be seen whether the new parties, while 
strengthening democracy, are also able to offer any real alternative. 
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